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Abstract
We will present a topological approach to the Arrow impossibility the-
orem of social choice theory that there exists no binary social choice rule
(which we will call a social welfare function) which satisﬁes the conditions
of transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), Pareto prin-
ciple and non-existence of dictator. Our research is in line with the studies
of topological approaches to discrete social choice problems initiated by
Baryshnikov (1993). But tools and techniques of algebraic topology which
we will use are more elementary than those in Baryshnikov (1993). Our
main tools are homology groups of simplicial complexes. And we will
consider the case where individual preferences are weak orders, that is,
individuals may be indiﬀerent about any pair of alternatives. This point
is an extension of the analysis by Baryshnikov (1993).
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1 Introduction
Topological approaches to social choice problems have been initiated by Chichilnisky
(1980). In her model a space of alternatives is a subset of a Euclidean space,
and individual preferences over this set are represented by normalized gradient
˚This paper is scheduled to be published in Applied Mathematics and Computa-
tion(Elsevier).
1ﬁelds. Her main result is an impossibility theorem that there exists no continu-
ous social choice rule which satisﬁes unanimity and anonymity. This approach
has been further developed by Chichilnisky (1979), (1982), Koshevoy (1997),
Lauwers (2004), Weinberger (2004), and so on. On the other hand, Barysh-
nikov (1993) and (1997) have presented a topological approach to Arrow’s gen-
eral possibility theorem, which is usually called the Arrow impossibility theorem
(Arrow (1963)), in a discrete framework of social choice1. But he used an ad-
vanced concept of algebraic topology, nerve of a covering. It is not dealt with
in most elementary textbooks of algebraic topology, and is diﬃcult of access for
most economists. And he considered only the case where individual preferences
are strict, that is, individuals are never indiﬀerent about any pair of alterna-
tives. In this paper we will attempt a more simple and elementary topological
approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem under the assumption of the free
triple property. Our main tools are homology groups of simplicial complexes.
It is a basic concept of algebraic topology, and is dealt with in almost all ele-
mentary textbooks in this ﬁeld. And we will consider the case where individual
preferences are weak orders, that is, individuals may be indiﬀerent about any
pair of alternatives. This point is an extension of the analysis by Baryshnikov
(1993).
Mainly we will show the following results.
(1) Let ∆ be an inclusion map from the set of individual preferences to the
set of the social preference. Let ii be an inclusion map from the set of the
preference of individual i (a representative individual) to the set of the
social preference, and F be a binary social choice rule (which we will call
a social welfare function). Let pF ˝ ∆q˚ and pF ˝ iiq˚ be homomorphisms
of homology groups induced by the composite functions of these inclusion
maps and F. Then, we will obtain the following results2.
pF ˝ ∆q˚ “
k ÿ
i“1
pF ˝ iiq˚ pk is the number of individualsq
and
pF ˝ ∆q˚ ‰ 0
(2) On the other hand, if social welfare functions satisfy the conditions of
transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
and non-existence of dictator3, we can show
pF ˝ iiq˚ “ 0 for all i
1About surveys and basic results of topological social choice theories, see Mehta (1997)
and Lauwers (2000).
2A homomorphism h is a mapping from a group A to another group B which satisﬁes
hpx ` yq “ hpxq ` hpyq for x P A, y P B.
3A dictator is an individual whose strict preference always coincide with the social prefer-
ence.
2(1) and (2) contradict. Therefore, there exists no binary social choice
rule which satisﬁes transitivity, Pareto principle, IIA and non-existence of
dictator.
In the next section we present our model and calculate the homology groups
of simplicial complexes which represent individual preferences. In Section 3 we
will prove the main results.
2 The model and simplicial complexes
There are npě 3q alternatives and kpě 2q individuals. n and k are ﬁnite positive
integers. Denote individual i’s preference by pi. A combination of individual
preferences, which is called a preference proﬁle, is denoted by p, and the set
of preference proﬁles is denoted by Pk. The alternatives are represented by
xi, i “ 1,2,¨¨¨ ,n. Individual preferences over the alternatives are weak orders,
that is, individuals strictly prefer one alternative to another, or are indiﬀerent
between them. We consider a social choice rule which determines a social pref-
erence corresponding to a preference proﬁle. It is called a social welfare function
and is denoted by Fppq. We assume the free triple property, that is, for each
combination of three alternatives individual preferences are never restricted.
Social welfare functions must satisfy transitivity, Pareto principle and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The meanings of the latter two condi-
tions are as follows.
Pareto principle When all individuals prefer an alternative xi to another al-
ternative xj, the society must prefer xi to xj.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) The social preference about
every pair of two alternatives xi and xj is determined by only individual
preferences about these alternatives. Individual preferences about other
alternatives do not aﬀect the social preference about xi and xj.
The Arrow impossibility theorem states that there exists no binary social choice
rule which satisﬁes the conditions of transitivity, IIA, Pareto principle and non-
existence of dictator. A dictator is an individual whose strict preference always
coincide with the social preference.
Hereafter we will consider a set of alternatives x1, x2 and x3. From the set
of individual preferences about x1, x2 and x3 we construct a simplicial complex
by the following procedures.
(1) A preference of an individual such that he prefers x1 to x2 is denoted by
p1,2q, a preference such that he prefers x2 to x1 by p2,1q, a preference
such that he is indiﬀerent between x1 and x2 by p1,2q, and similarly
for other pairs of alternatives. Deﬁne vertices of the simplicial complex
corresponding to pi,jq and pi,jq.
(2) A line segment between the vertices pi,jq and pk,lq is included in the





Figure 1: The simplicial complex made by strict preferences (C1)
the preference represented by pk,lq are consistent, that is, they satisfy
transitivity. For example, the line segment between p1,2q and p2,3q is
included, but the line segment between p1,2q and p2,1q is not included
in the simplicial complex. The line segment between p1,2q and p2,3q is
included, but the line segment between p1,2q and p1,2q is not included in
the simplicial complex.
(3) A triangle (circumference plus interior) made by three vertices pi,jq, pk,lq
and pm,nq is included in the simplicial complex if and only if the pref-
erences represented by pi,jq, pk,lq and pm,nq satisfy transitivity. For
example, since the preferences represented by p1,2q, p2,3q and p1,3q sat-
isfy transitivity, a triangle made by these three vertices is included in the
simplicial complex. But, since the preferences represented by p1,2q, p2,3q
and p3,1q do not satisfy transitivity, a triangle made by these three ver-
tices is not included in the simplicial complex. Similarly, a triangle which
includes a vertex pi,jq is included in the simplicial complex if and only if
the vertices of that triangle satisfy transitivity. Since the preferences rep-
resented by p1,2q, p2,3q and p1,3q satisfy transitivity, a triangle made by
these three vertices is included in the simplicial complex. But, since the
preferences represented by p1,2q, p2,3q and p3,1q do not satisfy transitiv-
ity, a triangle made by these three vertices is not included in the simplicial
complex.
The simplicial complex constructed by these procedures is denoted by P.
In Figure 1 the simplicial complex made by preferences which do not include
indiﬀerence (strict preferences) is depicted. This is called C1. It is homotopic to






made by preferences which may include indiﬀerence is constructed by adding
the following simplicial complexes to C1.
The triangle made by p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q and its edges and vertices.
The triangle made by p1,2q,p3,2q,p3,1q and its edges and vertices.
The triangle made by p1,3q,p1,2q,p3,2q and its edges and vertices.
The triangle made by p1,3q,p2,1q,p2,3q and its edges and vertices.
The triangle made by p2,3q,p1,2q,p1,3q and its edges and vertices.
The triangle made by p2,3q,p2,1q,p3,1q and its edges and vertices.
The triangle made by p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q and its edges and vertices
The ﬁrst two simplicial complexes are depicted in Figure 2. This is called
C2. The latter ﬁve simplicial complexes are depicted in Figure 3. This is called
D. Let us denote C “ C1 Y C2.
P is the union of C and D. The intersection of C and D is the graph
depicted in Figure 4. This is homotopic to isolated three points. It is denoted
by E. Its 0-dimensional homology group is isomorphic to the group of three
integers, and its 1-dimensional homology group is trivial, that is, H0pEq “ Z3
and H1pEq “ 0.
Now, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The 1-dimensional homology group of P is isomorphic to the group









Proof. P contains the following 1-dimensional simplices.
σ1 “ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, σ2 “ă p1,2q,p3,2q ą, σ3 “ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą
σ4 “ă p1,2q,p3,1q ą, σ5 “ă p2,1q,p2,3q ą, σ6 “ă p2,1q,p3,2q ą
σ7 “ă p2,1q,p1,3q ą, σ8 “ă p2,1q,p3,1q ą, σ9 “ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
σ10 “ă p2,3q,p3,1q ą, σ11 “ă p3,2q,p1,3q ą, σ12 “ă p3,2q,p3,1q ą
σ13 “ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, σ14 “ă p1,2q,p3,2q ą, σ15 “ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą
σ16 “ă p1,2q,p3,1q ą, σ17 “ă p2,3q,p1,2q ą, σ18 “ă p2,3q,p2,1q ą
σ19 “ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą, σ20 “ă p2,3q,p3,1q ą, σ21 “ă p1,3q,p1,2q ą
σ22 “ă p1,3q,p2,1q ą, σ23 “ă p1,3q,p2,3q ą, σ24 “ă p1,3q,p3,2q ą
σ25 “ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, σ26 “ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą, σ27 “ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą











Figure 4: E: (The intersection of C and D)
From this we obtain
Bc1pPq “p´a1 ´ a2 ´ a3 ´ a4 ` a17 ` a21q ă p1,2q ą
` p´a5 ´ a6 ´ a7 ´ a8 ` a18 ` a22q ă p2,1q ą
` pa1 ` a5 ´ a9 ´ a10 ` a13 ` a23q ă p2,3q ą
` pa2 ` a6 ´ a11 ´ a12 ` a14 ` a24q ă p3,2q ą
` pa3 ` a7 ` a9 ` a11 ` a15 ` a19q ă p1,3q ą
` pa4 ` a8 ` a10 ` a12 ` a16 ` a20q ă p3,1q ą
` p´a13 ´ a14 ´ a15 ´ a16 ´ a25 ´ a26q ă p1,2q ą
` p´a17 ´ a18 ´ a19 ´ a20 ` a25 ´ a27q ă p2,3q ą
` p´a21 ´ a22 ´ a23 ´ a24 ` a26 ` a27q ă p1,3q ą
The conditions for an element of the 1-dimensional chain group of P, c1pPq, to
be a cycle is Bc1pPq “ 0. For this condition to hold all coeﬃcients of Bc1pPq
must be zero, and we obtain the following equations.
´a1 ´ a2 ´ a3 ´ a4 ` a17 ` a21 “ 0, ´a5 ´ a6 ´ a7 ´ a8 ` a18 ` a22 “ 0
a1 ` a5 ´ a9 ´ a10 ` a13 ` a23 “ 0, a2 ` a6 ´ a11 ´ a12 ` a14 ` a24 “ 0
a3 ` a7 ` a9 ` a11 ` a15 ` a19 “ 0, a4 ` a8 ` a10 ` a12 ` a16 ` a20 “ 0
´a13 ´ a14 ´ a15 ´ a16 ´ a25 ´ a26 “ 0, ´a17 ´ a18 ´ a19 ´ a20 ` a25 ´ a27 “ 0
´a21 ´ a22 ´ a23 ´ a24 ` a26 ` a27 “ 0
7Summing up the ﬁrst 8 equations side by side we get the last equation. There-
fore, only 8 equations are independent, and we can freely choose the values
of 19 variables among a1,a2,¨¨¨ ,a27. Thus, the 1-dimensional cycle group of
P, Z1pPq, is isomorphic to the group of 19 integers, that is, Z1pPq – Z19. P
contains the following 2-dimensional simplices.
τ1 “ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą, τ2 “ă p1,2q,p3,2q,p3,1q ą
τ3 “ă p1,2q,p3,2q,p1,3q ą, τ4 “ă p2,1q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą
τ5 “ă p2,1q,p3,2q,p3,1q ą, τ6 “ă p2,1q,p2,3q,p3,1q ą
τ7 “ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą, τ8 “ă p1,2q,p3,2q,p3,1q ą
τ9 “ă p2,3q,p1,2q,p1,3q ą, τ10 “ă p2,3q,p2,1q,p3,1q ą
τ11 “ă p1,3q,p1,2q,p3,2q ą, τ12 “ă p1,3q,p2,1q,p2,3q ą
τ13 “ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą





b1, b2, ¨¨¨, b13 are integers. The image of the boundary homomorphism of the





“b1σ1 ` pb2 ` b3 ` b11qσ2 ` p´b1 ´ b3 ` b9qσ3 ´ b2σ4 ` pb4 ` b6 ` b12qσ5
` b5σ6 ´ b4σ7 ` p´b5 ´ b6 ` b10qσ8 ` pb1 ` b4 ` b7qσ9 ` b6σ10
` b3σ11 ` pb2 ` b5 ` b8qσ12 ` b7σ13 ` b8σ14 ´ b7σ15
´ b8σ16 ` b9σ17 ` b10σ18 ´ b9σ19 ´ b10σ20 ` b11σ21
` b12σ22 ´ b12σ23 ´ b11σ24 ` b13σ25 ´ b13σ26 ´ b13σ27 (2)
The values of the coeﬃcients of σ1, σ2, σ3, σ5, σ6, σ8, σ9, σ12, σ17, σ18, σ21,
σ22, σ25 are determined by b1, b2,¨¨¨ ,b13, and then the values of other σ’s are
also determined. Thus, the 1-dimensional boundary cycle group of P, B1pPq,
is isomorphic to the group of 13 integers, that is, B1pPq – Z13. Therefore, the
1-dimensional homology group of P is isomorphic to the group of 6 integers,
that is, we obtain H1pPq “ Z1pPq{B1pPq – Z6.
Next we consider the simplicial complex, Pk, made by the set of preference
proﬁles of individuals, Pk, about x1, x2 and x3. We can show the following
result.
Lemma 2. The 1-dimensional homology group of Pk is isomorphic to the group















2 depicted in Figure 5 and 64, C is represented as C “ C1 Y C2, C1 “
C1
1 Y C1
2, C2 “ C2
1 Y C2
2. C1 and C2 are homotopic to one point, and the
intersection of C1 and C2 consists of two segments and one point, which is
denoted by G. G is homotopic to three isolated points, and we have H1pGq “ 0
and H0pGq – Z3. From these arguments we obtain the following Mayer-Vietoris
exact sequences5,
H1pP ˆ Gqp– pZ6q3q
k1 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H1pP ˆ C1q ‘ H1pP ˆ C2qp– Z6 ‘ Z6q
w1 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H1pP ˆ Cq
α1 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H0pP ˆ Gqp– Z3q
k0 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H0pP ˆ C1q ‘ H0pP ˆ C2qp– Z ‘ Zq
w0 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H0pP ˆ Cqp– Zq Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ 0
Since w0 is a surjection (onto mapping)6, we have Image w0 – Z. By the
homomorphism theorem we obtain H0pP ˆ C1q ‘ H0pP ˆ C2q{Ker w0 – Z,
and then Ker w0 – Z is derived. Thus, from the condition of exact sequences
we have Image k0 – Ker w0 – Z. Again by the homomorphism theorem we
obtain H0pP ˆ Gq{Ker k0 – Image k0 – Z, and we get Ker k0 – Z ‘ Z. Thus,
we have Image α1 – Ker k0 – Z ‘ Z, and by the homomorphism theorem
H1pP ˆ Cq{Ker α1 – Z ‘ Z is derived. From the condition of exact sequences
we have Ker α1 – Image w1, and by the homomorphism theorem, H1pP ˆ
4C1
1 and C2
1 are depicted in Figure 5, and C1
2 and C2
2 are depicted in Figure 6.
5About homology groups, the homomorphism theorem and the Mayer-Vietoris exact se-
quences we referred to Tamura (1970) and Komiya (2001).

















C1q ‘ H1pP ˆ C2q{Ker w1 – Image w1 is derived. From the condition of exact
sequences we obtain Ker w1 – Image k1. Now let us consider Image k1.
Let x,y,z be the vertices of three connected components of G. Let
h P H1pPq, then h ˆ x P H1pP ˆ xq, h ˆ y P H1pP ˆ yq and
h ˆ z P H1pP ˆ zq belong to the diﬀerent homology classes. Since
C1 is connected, there exists a sequence of 1-dimensional simplices
connected x and y, and a sequence of 1-dimensional simplices con-
nected x and z. Thus, they belong to the same homology class in
H1pP ˆC1q. We can show a similar result for H1pP ˆC2q. Therefore
we obtain Image k1 – Z6.
From Ker w1 – Image k1 we have Ker w1 – Z6, and from H1pP ˆ C1q ‘
H1pP ˆC2q{Ker w1 – Image w1 we have Image w1 – Z6. Thus, Ker α1 – Z6 is
derived. Therefore, we obtain H1pP ˆ Cq – Z8. By similar procedures we can
show H1pP ˆ Dq – Z8.
Using this result we will show H1pP2q – Z12. Since P2 “ P ˆ pC Y Dq “
pP ˆ Cq Y pP ˆ Dq, and pP ˆ Cq X pP ˆ Dq “ P ˆ E we obtain the following
Mayer-Vietoris exact sequences.
H1pP ˆ Eqp– pZ6q3q
k1 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H1pP ˆ Cq ‘ H1pP ˆ Dqp– Z8 ‘ Z8q
w1 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H1pP2q
α1 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H0pP ˆ Eqp– Z3q
k0 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H0pP ˆ Cq ‘ H0pP ˆ Dqp– Z ‘ Zq
w0 Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ H0pP2qp– Zq Ý Ý Ý Ý Ñ 0
Since w0 is a surjection, we have Image w0 – Z. By the homomorphism theorem
we obtain H0pPˆCq‘H0pPˆDq{Ker w0 – Z, and Ker w0 – Z is derived. Thus,
10from the condition of exact sequences we have Image k0 – Ker w0 – Z. Again
by the homomorphism theorem we obtain H0pP ˆ Eq{Ker k0 – Image k0 – Z,
and Ker k0 – Z ‘ Z is derived. Thus, we have Image α1 – Ker k0 – Z ‘ Z,
and by the homomorphism theorem H1pP2q{Ker α1 – Z ‘ Z is derived. Again
from the condition of exact sequences we obtain Ker α1 – Image w1, and by the
homomorphism theorem we obtain H1pP ˆCq‘H1pP ˆDq{Ker w1 – Image w1.
Further, from the condition of exact sequences Ker w1 – Image k1 is derived.
Now consider Image k1.
Let x,y,z be the vertices of the connected components of E. Let h P
H1pPq, then hˆx P H1pPˆxq, hˆy P H1pPˆyq and hˆz P H1pPˆzq
belong to diﬀerent homology classes. But, since C is connected, there
exists a sequence of 1-dimensional simplices connecting x and y, and
a sequence of 1-dimensional simplices connecting x and z. Thus,
they belong to the same homology class in H1pP ˆ Cq. Similar for
H1pP ˆ Dq. Therefore, we obtain Image k1 – Z6.
From Ker w1 – Image k1 we have Ker w1 – Z6. And from H1pP ˆCq‘H1pP ˆ
Dq{Ker w1 – Image w1 we obtain Image w1 – Z10. Thus, Ker α1 – Z10 is
derived. Therefore, we get H1pP2q – Z12.
Inductively we can show H1pPkq – Z6k.
The social preference is also represented by P. The social preference about
xi and xj is pi,jq or pj,iq or pi,jq. By the condition of IIA, individual prefer-
ences about alternatives other than xi and xj do not aﬀect the social preference
about them. Thus, the social welfare function F is a function from the vertices
of Pk to the vertices of P. A set of points in Pk spans a simplex if and only if
individual preferences represented by these points are consistent, that is, they
satisfy transitivity, and then the social preference derived from the proﬁle rep-
resented by these points also satisﬁes transitivity. Therefore, if a set of points in
Pk spans a simplex, the set of points in P which represent the social preference
corresponding to these points in Pk also spans a simplex in P, and hence the
social welfare function is a simplicial map. It is naturally extended from the
vertices of Pk to all points in Pk. Each point in Pk is represented as a convex
combination of the vertices of Pk. This function is also denoted by F. When
P represents the social preference, we denote it by Ps. Then, F is deﬁned as a
function from Pk to Ps.
We deﬁne an inclusion map from P to Pk, ∆ : P ÝÑ Pk : p ÝÑ
pp,p,¨¨¨ ,pq, and an inclusion map which is derived by ﬁxing preferences of
individuals other than individual l to p´l, il : P ÝÑ Pk : p ÝÑ pp´l,pq. The
homomorphisms of 1-dimensional homology groups induced by these inclusion
maps are
∆˚ : Z6 ÝÑ Z6k : h ÝÑ ph,h,¨¨¨ ,hq, h P Z6
il˚ : Z6 ÝÑ Z6k : h ÝÑ p0,¨¨¨ ,h,¨¨¨ ,0q ponly the l-th component is h
and others are zero, h P Z6q
11From these deﬁnitions about ∆˚ and il˚ we obtain the following relation.
∆˚ “ i1˚ ` i2˚ ` ¨¨¨ ` in˚ (3)
And the homomorphism of homology groups induced by F is represented as
follows.
F˚ : Z6k ÝÑ Z6 : h “ ph1,h2,¨¨¨ ,hnq ÝÑ h, h P Z6
The composite function of il and the social welfare function F is F ˝il : P ÝÑ
Ps, and its induced homomorphism satisﬁes pF ˝ilq˚ “ F˚ ˝il˚. The composite
function of ∆ and F is F ˝ ∆ : P ÝÑ Ps, and its induced homomorphism
satisﬁes pF ˝ ∆q˚ “ F˚ ˝ ∆˚. From (3) we have
pF ˝ ∆q˚ “ pF ˝ i1q˚ ` pF ˝ i2q˚ ` ¨¨¨pF ˝ inq˚
F ˝ il when a preference proﬁle of individuals other than individual l is p´l
and F ˝il when a preference proﬁle of individuals other than individual l is p1
´l
are homotopic. Thus, the induced homomorphism pF ˝ ilq˚ of F ˝ il does not
depend on the preferences of individuals other than l.
Note: Let F ˝ ilpp´l,plq be the composite function of il and F when the pref-
erence proﬁle of individuals other than l is p´l, and F ˝ ilpp1
´l,plq be the
composite function of il and F when the preference proﬁle of individuals
other than l is p1
´l. The component for one individual (denoted by k) of
p´l and that of p1
´l are denoted by pk and p1
k. His preferences for the
pair of alternatives xi and xj are denoted by pkpi,jq and p1
kpi,jq. Each of
them corresponds to a point pi,jq or pj,iq or pi,jq in P. Let pm,nq be a
point in P such that pkpi,jq and p1
kpi,jq are diﬀerent from pm,nq, pn,mq
and pm,nq. Then, there exists a 1-dimensional simplex (a line segment)








kpi,jq “ p2t ´ 1qp1
kpi,jq ` p2 ´ 2tqpm,nq, if
1
2
ď t ď 1
Then, p2
kpi,jq is a point in P. Let us consider such p2
kpi,jq’s for all pairs




k’s for all individuals other than k are also deﬁned. Let p2
´l be a
combination of p2
k’s for all individuals other than l, and deﬁne
Hpp,tq “ Fpp2
´l,plq
Then, this is a homotopy between F ˝ ilpp´l,plq and F ˝ ilpp1
´l,plq.
Let z “ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ` ă p2,3q,p3,1q ą ´ ă p1,2q,p3,1q ą be a cycle
of P. By Pareto principle z corresponds to the same cycle in Ps by pF ˝ ∆q˚.
Since it is not a boundary cycle, we have pF ˝ ∆q˚ ‰ 0.
12Note: z is obtained by substituting a1 “ 1, a4 “ ´1, a10 “ 1 and 0 into all
other coeﬃcients of an element of the chain group of P expressed in (1).
For this z to be a boundary of some 2-dimensional simplex we must have
b1 “ b2 “ b6 “ 1 and bi “ 0 for all other coeﬃcients of Bc2pPq in (2). But
then, b5, b4, b3, b7, b8, b9, b10, b11, b12, b13 must be 0, and the coeﬃcient
of σ2 is 1. Thus, z is not a boundary cycle.
For a pair of alternatives xi and xj, a preference proﬁle, at which all individ-
uals prefer xi to xj , is denoted by pi,jqp`,`,¨¨¨,`q; a preference proﬁle, at which
they prefer xj to xi, is denoted by pi,jqp´,´,¨¨¨,´q. Similarly a preference proﬁle,
at which all individuals other than l prefer xi to xj, is denoted by pi,jq
p`,`,¨¨¨,`q
´l ;
a preference proﬁle, at which they prefer xj to xi, is denoted by pi,jq
p´,´,¨¨¨,´q
´l ; a
preference proﬁle, at which they are indiﬀerent between xi and xj, is denoted by
pi,jq
p0,0,¨¨¨,0q
´l . And a preference proﬁle, at which the preferences of individuals
other than l about xi and xj are not speciﬁed, is denoted by pi,jq
p?,?,¨¨¨,?q
´l .
3 The main results
From preliminary analyses in the previous section we will show the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. (1) If individual l is the dictator, we have
pF ˝ ilq˚ – pF ˝ ∆q˚
that is, pF ˝ ilq˚ and pF ˝ ∆q˚ are isomorphic.
(2) If individual l is not a dictator, we have
pF ˝ ilq˚ “ 0
Proof. (1) Consider three alternatives x1, x2 and x3 and a preference proﬁle p
over these alternatives such that the preferences of individuals other than







is, they are indiﬀerent about x1, x2 and x3. If individual l is the dictator,
correspondences from his preference to the social preference by F ˝ il are
as follows,
p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,1ql ÝÑ p2,1q
p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q, p3,2ql ÝÑ p3,2q
p1,3ql ÝÑ p1,3q, p3,1ql ÝÑ p3,1q
p1,2ql and p2,1ql denote the preference of individual l about x1 and x2.
p2,3ql, p3,2ql and so on are similar. These correspondences are completely
identical to the correspondences by F ˝ ∆. Further, since we assume that
individuals other than l are indiﬀerent about x1, x2 and x3, correspon-
dences from the preferences of individual l, p1,2ql, p2,3ql and p1,3ql, to the
13social preference by F˝il are also identical to the correspondences by F˝∆.
Therefore, the homomorphism of homology groups, pF ˝ ∆q˚ induced by
F ˝ ∆, and the homomorphism of homology groups, pF ˝ ilq˚, which is
induced by F ˝il, are identical (isomorphic), that is, pF ˝ilq˚ – pF ˝∆q˚.
(2) Consider three alternatives x1, x2 and x3 and a preference proﬁle p over
these alternatives such that the preferences of individuals other than l







individual l is not a dictator, there exists a preference proﬁle at which the
social preference about some pair of alternatives does not coincide with
the strict preference of individual l. Assume that when the preference
of individual l is p1,2q, the social preference is p2,1q or p2,1q. Then,




´l ˆ p1,2ql ÝÑ p2,1q or p2,1q
By Pareto principle we have
p1,3qp`,`,¨¨¨,`q ÝÑ p1,3q
Then, from transitivity we obtain
p2,3q
p`,`,¨¨¨,`q
´l ˆ p3,2ql ÝÑ p2,3q
By Pareto principle we have
p1,2qp`,`,¨¨¨,`q ÝÑ p1,2q
From transitivity we obtain the following correspondence.
p1,3q
p`,`,¨¨¨,`q
´l ˆ p3,1ql ÝÑ p1,3q
Further, by Pareto principle we have
p2,3qp´,´,¨¨¨,´q ÝÑ p3,2q
From transitivity we get the following correspondence.
p1,2q
p`,`,¨¨¨,`q
´l ˆ p2,1ql ÝÑ p1,2q
From these results we ﬁnd that at the preference proﬁle p, where the







´l , correspondences from the preference of
individual l to the social preference by F ˝ il are obtained as follows.
p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,1ql ÝÑ p1,2q
p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q, p3,2ql ÝÑ p2,3q
p1,3ql ÝÑ p1,3q, p3,1ql ÝÑ p1,3q
From these correspondences with transitivity and IIA we ﬁnd the following
fact.
14Sub-lemma 3.1. When individual l is indiﬀerent between x1 and x3, the
society prefers x1 to x3, that is, we obtain the following correspondence.
p1,3ql ÝÑ p1,3q
Proof. This is derived from two correspondences p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q and
p3,2ql ÝÑ p2,3q.
Thus, the following four sets of correspondences are impossible because
the correspondences in each set are not consistent with p1,3ql ÝÑ p1,3q.
(i) p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q
(ii) p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p3,2q
(iii) p1,2ql ÝÑ p2,1q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p3,2q
(iv) p1,2ql ÝÑ p2,1q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q
And, we have the following ﬁve cases. They are consistent with the cor-
respondence p1,3ql ÝÑ p1,3q.
(i) Case (i): p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q
(ii) Case (ii): p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q
(iii) Case (iii): p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q
(iv) Case (iv): p1,2ql ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p3,2q
(v) Case (v): p1,2ql ÝÑ p2,1q, p2,3ql ÝÑ p2,3q
We consider each case in detail.
(i) Case (i): p1,2q ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3q ÝÑ p2,3q
The vertices mapped by F ˝il to the social preference from the pref-
erence of individual l span the following ﬁve simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą,
ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 1-dimensional chain group is written as
c1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `a2 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a3 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `a5 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą, ai P Z
The condition for an element of the 1-dimensional chain group to be
a cycle is
Bc1 “p´a1 ´ a2q ă p1,2q ą `pa1 ´ a3 ` a4q ă p2,3q ą `pa2 ` a3 ` a5q ă p1,3q ą
` p´a4 ´ a5q ă p1,2q ą“ 0
15From this
´a1 ´ a2 “ 0, a1 ´ a3 ` a4 “ 0, a2 ` a3 ` a5 “ 0, ´a4 ´ a5 “ 0
are derived. Then, we obtain a2 “ ´a1, a5 “ ´a4, a3 “ a1 ` a4.
Therefore, an element of the 1-dimensional cycle group, Z1, is written
as follows.
z1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´a1 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `pa1 ` a4q ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´a4 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą
On the other hand, the vertices span the following 2-dimensional
simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 2-dimensional chain group is written as
c2 “ b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą `b2 ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą, bi P Z
And an element of the 1-dimensional boundary cycle group, B1, is
written as follows.
Bc2 “b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´b1 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `pb1 ` b2q ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` b2 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´b2 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą
Then, we ﬁnd that B1 is isomorphic to Z1, and so the 1-dimensional
homology group is trivial, that is, we have proved pF ˝ ilq˚ “ 0.
(ii) Case (ii): p1,2q ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3q ÝÑ p2,3q
The vertices mapped by F ˝il to the social preference from the pref-
erence of individual l span the following ﬁve simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,3q,p1,2q ą,
ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 1-dimensional chain group is written as
c1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `a2 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a3 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p2,3q,p1,2q ą `a5 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
The condition for an element of the 1-dimensional chain group to be
a cycle is
Bc1 “p´a1 ´ a2 ` a4q ă p1,2q ą `pa1 ´ a3q ă p2,3q ą `pa2 ` a3 ` a5q ă p1,3q ą
` p´a4 ´ a5q ă p2,3q ą“ 0
From this
´a1 ´ a2 ` a4 “ 0, a1 ´ a3 “ 0, a2 ` a3 ` a5 “ 0, ´a4 ´ a5 “ 0
16are derived. Then, we obtain a3 “ a1, a5 “ ´a4, a2 “ a4 ´ a1
Therefore, an element of the 1-dimensional cycle group, Z1, is written
as follows.
z1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `pa4 ´ a1q ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a1 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´a4 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą
On the other hand, the vertices span the following 2-dimensional
simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,3q,p1,2q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 2-dimensional chain group is written as
c2 “ b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą `b2 ă p2,3q,p1,2q,p1,3q ą
And an element of the 1-dimensional boundary cycle group, B1, is
written as follows.
Bc2 “b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `pb2 ´ b1q ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `b1 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` b2 ă p2,3q,p1,2q ą ´b2 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
We ﬁnd that B1 is isomorphic to Z1, and so the 1-dimensional ho-
mology group is trivial, that is, we have proved pF ˝ ilq˚ “ 0.
(iii) Case (iii): p1,2q ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3q ÝÑ p2,3q
The vertices mapped by F ˝il to the social preference from the pref-
erence of individual l span the following three simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 1-dimensional chain group is written as
c1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `a2 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a3 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
The condition for an element of the 1-dimensional chain group to be
a cycle is
Bc1 “p´a1 ´ a2q ă p1,2q ą `pa1 ´ a3q ă p2,3q ą `pa2 ` a3q ă p1,3q ą“ 0
From this
´a1 ´ a2 “ 0, a1 ´ a3 “ 0, a2 ` a3 “ 0
are derived, and we obtain a2 “ ´a1, a3 “ a1. Therefore, an element
of the 1-dimensional cycle group, Z1, is written as follows.
z1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´a1 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a1 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
17On the other hand, the vertices span the following 2-dimensional
simplex.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 2-dimensional chain group is written as
c2 “ b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą
And an element of the 1-dimensional boundary cycle group, B1, is
written as follows.
Bc2 “b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´b1 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `b1 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
We ﬁnd that B1 is isomorphic to Z1, and so the 1-dimensional ho-
mology group is trivial, that is, we have proved pF ˝ ilq˚ “ 0.
(iv) Case (iv): p1,2q ÝÑ p1,2q, p2,3q ÝÑ p3,2q
The vertices mapped by F ˝il to the social preference from the pref-
erence of individual l span the following ﬁve simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p3,2q,p1,2q ą,
ă p3,2q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 1-dimensional chain group is written as
c1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `a2 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a3 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p3,2q,p1,2q ą `a5 ă p3,2q,p1,3q ą
The condition for an element of the 1-dimensional chain group to be
a cycle is
Bc1 “p´a1 ´ a2 ` a4q ă p1,2q ą `pa1 ´ a3q ă p2,3q ą `pa2 ` a3 ` a5q ă p1,3q ą
` p´a4 ´ a5q ă p3,2q ą“ 0
From this
´a1 ´ a2 ` a4 “ 0, a1 ´ a3 “ 0, a2 ` a3 ` a5 “ 0, ´a4 ´ a5 “ 0
are derived, and we obtain a3 “ a1, a5 “ ´a4, a2 “ a4 ´ a1. There-
fore, an element of the 1-dimensional cycle group, Z1, is written as
follows.
z1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `pa4 ´ a1q ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a1 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p3,2q,p2,3q ą ´a4 ă p3,2q,p1,3q ą
On the other hand, the vertices span the following 2-dimensional
simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p3,2q,p1,2q,p1,3q ą
18Then, an element of the 2-dimensional chain group is written as
c2 “ b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą `b2 ă p3,2q,p1,2q,p1,3q ą
And an element of the 1-dimensional boundary cycle group, B1, is
written as follows.
Bc2 “b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `pb2 ´ b1q ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `b1 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` b2 ă p3,2q,p1,2q ą ´b2 ă p3,2q,p1,3q ą
We ﬁnd that B1 is isomorphic to Z1, and so the 1-dimensional ho-
mology group is trivial, that is, we have proved pF ˝ ilq˚ “ 0.
(v) Case (v): p1,2q ÝÑ p2,1q, p2,3q ÝÑ p2,3q
The vertices mapped by F ˝il to the social preference from the pref-
erence of individual l span the following ﬁve simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą, ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,1q,p2,3q ą,
ă p2,1q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 1-dimensional chain group is written as
c1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą `a2 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `a3 ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p2,1q,p2,3q ą `a5 ă p2,1q,p1,3q ą
The condition for an element of the 1-dimensional chain group to be
a cycle is
Bc1 “p´a1 ´ a2q ă p1,2q ą `pa1 ´ a3 ` a4q ă p2,3q ą `pa2 ` a3 ` a5q ă p1,3q ą
` p´a4 ´ a5q ă p2,1q ą“ 0
From this
´a1 ´ a2 “ 0, a1 ´ a3 ` a4 “ 0, a2 ` a3 ` a5 “ 0, ´a4 ´ a5 “ 0
are derived, and we obtain a2 “ ´a1, a5 “ ´a4, a3 “ a1 ` a4.
Therefore, an element of the 1-dimensional cycle group is represented
as follows.
z1 “a1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´a1 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `pa1 ` a4q ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` a4 ă p2,1q,p2,3q ą ´a4 ă p2,1q,p1,3q ą
On the other hand, the vertices span the following 2-dimensional
simplices.
ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą, ă p2,1q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą
Then, an element of the 2-dimensional chain group is written as
c2 “ b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą `b2 ă p2,1q,p2,3q,p1,3q ą
19And an element of the 1-dimensional boundary cycle group, B1, is
written as follows.
Bc2 “b1 ă p1,2q,p2,3q ą ´b1 ă p1,2q,p1,3q ą `pb1 ` b2q ă p2,3q,p1,3q ą
` b2 ă p2,1q,p2,3q ą ´b2 ă p2,1q,p1,3q ą
We ﬁnd that B1 is isomorphic to Z1, and so the 1-dimensional ho-
mology group is trivial, that is, we have proved pF ˝ ilq˚ “ 0.
We have completely proved pF ˝ ilq˚ “ 0 in all cases.
From these arguments and pF ˝ ∆q˚ ‰ 0 there exists the dictator about x1,
x2 and x3. Let individual l be the dictator. Interchanging x3 with x4 in the
proof of this lemma, we can show that he is the dictator about x1, x2 and x4.
Similarly, we can show that he is the dictator about x5, x2 and x4, he is the
dictator about x5, x6 and x4. After all he is the dictator about all alternatives,
and hence we obtain
Theorem 1 (The Arrow impossibility theorem). There exists the dictator
for any social welfare function which satisﬁes transitivity, Pareto principle and
IIA.
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences
are weak orders under the assumption of free-triple property using elementary
concepts and techniques of algebraic topology, in particular, homology groups
of simplicial complexes and homomorphisms of homology groups induced by
simplicial maps.
Our approach may be applied to other problems of social choice theory such
as Wilson’s impossibility theorem (Wilson (1972)), the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem (Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)), and Amartya Sen’s liberal
paradox (Sen (1979)).
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